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The Fragilityof the Moral Self*
Hille Haker
HarvardDivinity School

Exemplary of both the self's loss of sovereignty and a new paradigm in ethical
thought,which could be called "ethics after autonomy,"is the dialogue about the
self-otherrelationin currentpost-structuralistthought.This dialogue seems to occupy a marginalpositionin contemporarymainstreamethicaldiscourse.I shall argue
that this is unfortunate,because reflecting on the self enables us to gain important
insights into the basis of morality and thus to broaden our reflections about the
subjectof morality,to which I shall refer as the "moralself." In this essay, I want
to consider two aspects of the moral self. First, what does the constitutive fragility
of the self, a fragilitythatis determinedby the impossibility of sovereignty, mean
for the concept of the moral self? Second, what are the implications for the moral
self of what I shall referto, following Levinas and Derrida,as the "structureof the
adieu,"which requiresthat the ontological perspective (i.e., Heidegger's "beingtowards-death"),which is constitutivefor the care for oneself, must be transformed
into an ethical/moralperspective of caring about the (death of the) other?
The dynamic of self-constitutionin the face of the other, throughand with the
other,is based on a linguistic, or in any case on a discursive act. By way of social
appellation and subject-formation,self-constitution is a public, heteronomous
process that occurs before any self-definition or self-identity emerges. Foucault
andcriticaltheoryalike emphasizethatexistence in this sense is thoroughlymorally
impregnatedbefore any self-reflective assessment takes place, although existence
is not only this moralrelation.Foucault(andJudithButler,who follows him in this
regard)has analyzedthis aspect of self-constitutionas the impregnationof the self
by many and diverseforms of social normsand moral authority.Both Foucault and
Butler insist on the paradoxicalstructureof self-constitution, insofar as the self
both desires and actively takes on the very subjectivationagainst which it defends
*I am grateful to the translatorof a former version of this text, William Whitney, and to Gene
McGarryof HTR for furtherhelp.
HTR 97:4 (2004) 359-81
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itself.' To a greatextent, the self participatesin a socially and psychically mediated
discourse that displaces its individualityand its particularity,and that makes any
recourse to a "core"of subjectivity (of the self or of the subject) appearto be a
myth of subjectphilosophy.Thus,the subjectis boundto a discoursethatexpels the
individualityof the self from the discourse at the very moment of its constitution.
Contraryto newer phenomenologicalapproaches,however, this "self"'cannotfind
refuge in the body or in corporeality-there is no unmediatedaccess to an inner
self or to a bodily self.2
My question, however, goes beyond this first stage of elaboratingon the paradoxical structureof self-constitution. For what is at stake for the concept of the
ethical/moralself is not only the self in relationto the social andpsychic structures
that both constrainand enable it, but also the relation of the self to the otheras a
currently-concreteother, and thus the relation of responsibility between the self
and the other.To formulatean ethical concept of the self, Foucault consideredthe
relationof ethics and aesthetics, drawingon the ancientGreekconcept of "carefor
the self": Is there a form of individual existence, he asked, which is more than a
socially derivedexistence?On the otherhand,can ethics be morethana structureof
compulsion and social force, or even violence? Whatis at stake here is not simply
the generalrelationof ethics and aesthetics,but rather,and more radically,the very
possibility and condition of what I am calling the moralself. Contraryto Foucault,
I refer to the moral self, for, as we shall see, it would be an undue reductionto
establish a concept of ethical existence along the lines of care for the self, as this
would relegate the other to the backgroundof this self-relation.Thus, I hold that
Foucault'sshift was a necessary,thoughnot sufficient,turnin formulatingan ethical concept of the self: self-creationis no substitutefor a practicalself, but rather
one specific featureof it. Thus, an understandingof the self will prove inadequate
if it does not take into account the dialectical relation between aesthetics-more
specifically,the narrativeconstructionof identity-and the challengeof the socially,
culturally,and historically shaped world that the self is part of. It seems that in
Foucault'sunderstanding,the relationof the self and the otheris so pre-shapedby
the concept of the social derivationof the individual and the overridingpower of
the discourse in self-constitutionthat the moral relation of the self and the other
remainsvague. I shall returnto this post-structuralistconcept of the moralself by
way of a reading of JudithButler's latest writings. First, however, I shall review
Paul Ricceur'sperspective on the self-otherrelation.

'Judith Butler, The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford
University Press, 1997). See also Annika Thiem, "Unbecoming Subjects: Subject Formationand
Responsibility in the Context of Judith Butler's Thought"(Ph.D. diss., Tiibingen, 2004).
2ElisabethList, Grenzender Verfiigbarkeit:Die Technik,das Subjekt,unddas Lebendige(Vienna:
Passagen-Verlag, 2001). For an approachmore suited to the new phenomenological understanding
of the self and corporeality,see BernardWaldenfels, Das leibliche Selbst: Vorlesungenzur Phiinomenologie des Leibes (Frankfurtam Main: Suhrkamp,2000).
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Ricceur'sNarrativeand Ethical Self

In his 1990 book Soi-memecommeun autre,Ricceurintroduceda conceptof ethical/
moral identity quite distinct from the short-lived concepts of the liberal self and
the communitarianself put forwardin the 1980s and 1990s.3According to Ricceur,
the constitution of the self is the formation of a successful identity. This is not,
however,to be understoodas the unity of one's bio-graphyor life-story-that is, as
the successful integrationof all events into a unified perspective;rather,personal
identityis practicalidentity,in the sense of a self-related"strivingfor the good life,
with others,in just institutions."This self-related,but neverthelesspartlyaltruistic
strivingis the reflective will, which is inherentin the structureof personhood and
any practicalconcept of the self. The will for the good is, as a reflective striving,
always orientedtowardsthe success of one's personallife in relationto and with the
other,as it is articulatedin the narrativeof one's life, one's bio-graphy.Self-esteem,
care for the other,and a sense of justice are the threeethical dimensions within this
teleological perspective on the ethical self. Ricceur'sethical self is, therefore,not
identical with the subject of care for the self in the Foucauldiansense, although
the two share a close relationto aesthetic existence.
For Ricceur,a concept of ethical identity in the teleological sense would indeed
be sufficient,were therenot a rift within the good life itself: the problem-and the
enigma-of evil. In the face of evil, the "original wound" that is inherentin free
will, the necessity of transcendingthe teleological perspectivearises,in the shapeof
the demandto recognize the deontologically established inhibition of morality:
Becausethereis evil,theaimof the"goodlife"hasto be submitted
to thetest
of moralobligation,whichmightbe describedin the followingterms:"Act
withthemaximby whichyou canwishat thesametime
solelyin accordance
thatwhatoughtnot to be, namelyevil, will indeednot exist."4
Morality,says Ricoeur,demands overcoming factual asymmetry,which is the
signatureof power relations,in favor of normativesymmetry.Moralityleads to the
institutionalizationof prohibitions,which are meant to bring normativesymmetry
and factual symmetrycloser together.Insteadof insisting on a separationbetween
the spheresof ethicalandmoralexistence (as is the case in Kantianandneo-Kantian
attemptsto subordinateethics to morality), Riceeurdescribes their dialectic and
their interdependence. Considered from an ethical perspective, his concept of
ethical/moralidentity,which emerges from the interrelationbetween care for the
self andan interestin living togetherwith others in just institutions,constrainedby
the recognitionof mutualrespect, seems to be a promising approach,since it takes
3Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another (trans. Kathleen Blamey; Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1992). For a delineation of these and other concepts of ethical/moral identity, see Hille Haker,
Moralische Identitiit: Literarische Lebensgeschichten als Medium ethischer Reflexion, mit einer
Interpretationder Jahrestage von Uwe Johnson (Tiibingen: Francke, 1999).
4Ricoeur,Oneself as Another, 218.
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seriously the relationof the ethical and moral sphereswithinthe concept of practical identity.5Consideredfrom an aestheticperspective,however,Ricoeur'sconcept
might be questioned, because it does not take seriously enough the constructive
natureof narrativeidentity as an inherentdimension of practicalidentity.
Unlike, for example, AlasdairMacIntyre,who has also proposed a concept of
narrativeidentity,Ricoeuris muchless concernedwithrestoring,or only postulating,
a unified identity.For Ricoeur,literarynarrativesin particularbecome a medium
for both exploring andjeopardizing that unity. In this respect, the fictions of the
early twentieth centuryare extreme forms of "identitylaboratories,"works of art
about loss of identity, the impossibility of a unified identity, loss of sovereignty,
rupture,and the accentuationof discord over concord. But even the most radical
literaryversions of a fragmented,derivative,or imaginativeidentity-Ricceur cites
Joyce, Musil, and Kafka-do not and cannot dismiss the underlying(teleological)
concept of narrativeidentity, which is of pivotal relevance for practicalidentity.
Thus,Ricceurarguesfor a modifiedconceptof mimesis thatrecognizes a dialectical
relationshipbetween fiction andreality,for which he introducesthe term"crossed
reference."Ricoeur'sethics is to be understoodas addressingthe tension of the
"crossedreference"of fictionandreality,narrationandexperience,withinpractical
identity.As much as Ricceuracknowledges the loss of the unified self in (modern)
literature,however,the questionremainsas to whetherhe does justice to the radical
natureof the actualnon-sovereigntyof the self in his concept of ethical andmoral
identity, and whetherhe does not ignore the necessity of going beyond teleology
and the concept of the unified self in search of a referencepoint for identity.
Over the last few years, the question of narrativityhas become more urgentin
ethical theory.One strikingexample of this tendency is the recent work of Judith
Butler,who has indicatedthe limits of a concept of narrativeidentity andeven the
dangersit poses for an ethics of nonviolence.6Since Butler's approachis close to
my own, I shall analyze it in some detail.

i Butler's Critiqueof Ethical Violence
InherAdornoLectures,presentedin 2002 atFrankfurt
University,Butlerelaborateson
some
valuable
on narrativityand identity:7
of
the
reflections
self, offering
concepts
5Fora more comprehensive reflection, see Haker,Moralische Identitdit;and ChristophMandry,
Ethische Identitiit und christlicher Glaube: Theologische Ethik im Spannungsfeld von Theologie
und Philosophie (Mainz: Matthias-GrtinewaldVerlag, 2002).
6Butlerdoes not engage Ricoeur'sconcept of ethics, which is incomprehensible in view of the
proximity of her concerns to those addressed in his works Time and Narrative (trans. Kathleen
McLaughlin and David Pellauer; 3 vols.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984-1988) and
Oneself as Another.
7JudithButler, Kritik der ethischen Gewalt (Frankfurtam Main: Suhrkamp, 2003) 8. Parts of
these lectures were published in English as Giving an Account of Oneself: A Critique of Ethical
Violence (Amsterdam:Van Gorcum, 2003). The two texts, however, do not correspond precisely.
I am grateful to JudithButler for providing me with the English manuscriptof her Adorno lectures,
quotations from which I cite as "translation:English manuscript,J.B."
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Wennich, wie ich dastueundtunmuss,die Fragestelle:,,Wassoll ich tun?,"
dannmusszundchsteinmalein ,,Ich"entstandensein, das sich zum GegenstandseineseigenenDenkensnehmenkann... bezieheich michdannnicht
immerschonaufeinesozialeWelt,in derganzbestimmte
Artenvon Optionen
miglich sindundanderenicht?8
The tension between the self as an agent who must suspendher non-sovereignty
in orderto act andthe recognitionof the social derivationof the self is itself based on
the possibility of self-reflection.Accordingto Butler,AdornoandFoucaultareboth
concernedto addressthe capacityof the self-despite all of the social normativity
directedat it-to be more thanjust the productof adaptationto social norms and
normalization.Both presupposethe loss of subject sovereignty.While Adorno insists on the necessity of reflectingon social conditions and the historicity of social
norms,9Foucault is more interestedin the self-relation of the socially constituted
self. Moral agency, he claims, requiresthe "unityof an ethical life"--although this
is not somethinga self could claim to "have"by way of being an agent. Instead,it is
an open question, a challenge resultingin the self-reflective relationof the self and
social norms.10This is the point at which Butler begins her inquiry:The normative
force of the "social"is, in light of the process of self-constitution,based both on a
strugglefor recognitionandon relationshipsbased on recognition.The self, seeking
and grantingrecognition, does so as a socially formed, non-sovereign "self' who
does not herself determinethe backgroundconstraintsof social recognition. And
yet, it is "diese Desorientierungder Perspektive meines Lebens, dieses Moment
einer Indifferenzin der Gesellschaftlichkeit,das mein Leben sttitzt.""1
Here, Butler departsfrom both inclusive and exclusive versions of the relation
of ethics and morality.Agreeing with Foucaultthat human agency is related to the
"unityof the ethical life," she considers both the teleological perspective and the
temporalityof the self-relation.It is in these two aspects that the coincidence of
narrativeidentity and ethical identityis to be found. Butler uses the expression "to
give an accountof oneself' for this inherentrelationbetween being responsible for
one's actions and narration,the life-story. But in this dependence on narration,the
rift within the self is revealed in its most radical way. At the root of the moral self,
which is dependenton the concept of an agent who is accountablefor her actions,
the self must concede thatthe accountof herself is not the account of her self. The
agent is sub-jectedto normsthatshe has not chosen but that neverthelessconstrain
8Butler,Kritik, 8. "When I, as I do and must do, raise the question: 'What ought I to do?,' an 'I'
must have first come into being, taking itself as the object of its reflection . . do I not then refer to
a social world, in which certain options are possible, and others are not?" (my translation).
9SeeTheodorW.Adorno, Probleme der Moralphilosophie (1963) (Frankfurtam Main: Suhrkamp,
1996).
"oMichelFoucault, The Use of Pleasure (vol. 2 of The History of Sexuality; trans. Robert Hurley;
London: Penguin, 1990-1992). Compare Butler, Kritik, 27.
"Butler,Kritik,48. "Butit is, paradoxically,this interruption,this disorientationof the perspective
of my life, this instance of an indifferencein sociality, that sustains my living" (translation:English
manuscript,J.B.).
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her actions. She is not transparentto herself. She tells her story in dialogue with
anotherperson, and dependingon whom she tells it to, when she tells it, and why
she tells it, her "story"will turnout differently.All these stories togetherboth tell
and conceal the self's story,which is in fact untellable:
von mirselbstzu geben,wennich versuche,
Wennich versuche,Rechenschaft
zu machen,dannkannich miteinernarramichanerkennbar
undverstindlich
aberdieseErzdihlung
wirdverschoben
meinesLebensbeginnen,
tivenDarstellung
Undbis zu einemgewissenGradmuss
durchdas,wasnichtnurmirzugehdrt.
zu machen.Die narrative
Auichmichersetzbar
machen,ummichanerkennbar
bestimmter
undderZeitlichkeit
des,,Ich"mussderPerspektivitdit
toritiit
Normen
in Fragestellen.12
meinerGeschichte
weichen,diedie Singularitdit
Every storyof the self is thuspreliminaryand,in certainways, fictitious.It is, as
Butlersays, too late-although it is equallycorrectto say,withWalterBenjamin,that
it is too early,since the "truestory"could only be told on one's deathbed,atthe endof
the self's future,which beforethis dead end of life always threatensto transformthe
momentarilypresentperspective.The authorityof the narrator,Benjaminimplies,is
an authorityderivedfromdeath:"Whatis the most wonderfulaspectof a storyteller?
He appearsto be able to narratehis whole life; each narrativeis just a fragmentof his
whole life."'3Butlerdenies this authorityto the self and,correspondingly,deniesthe
sovereigntyof narrativeunity.Moral identityis of a provisionalnature,and is thus
the ruptureof narrativeunityratherthanthe confirmationof it.
The addressingof the self by the otheris essentialfor the constitutionof the self.
The otherinscribes "herself' into the self, long before the addressedself is able to
respondin a self-reflective way. The self is expropriatedby this addressing-yet
at the same time, I myself can only be myself in and throughthis "subjectivation."
Psychoanalysisrevisits these scenes of self-development.More thananythingelse,
it elucidates the non-sovereigntyof the self as it is actualized in every relation.14
Psychoanalysis and ethics converge in their reflections on the origins of the self:

12Ibid., 49-50. "If I try to give an account of myself, if I try to make myself recognizable and
understandable,then I might begin with a narrativeaccountof my life, but this narrativewill be disoriented by what is not mine, or what is not mine alone. And I will, to some degree, have to make myself
substitutablein orderto make myself recognizable.The narrativeauthorityof the 'I' must give way to
the perspectiveand temporalityof a set of norms that contest the singularityof my story"(translation:
English manuscript,J.B.). Similarly,Butler states in Giving an Account: "Whenthe 'I' seeks to give
an accountof itself, an account which must include the conditions of its own emergence, it must, as a
matterof necessity, become a social theorist.. .. The 'I' is always to some extent dispossessed by the
social conditions of its emergence"(12-13).
ist: dass er so wirktals konne er sein ganzes Leben erzdihlen;
13"Wasam Erzihler das Wunderbarste
alles Erziihltesei nur erst ein Stiick seines ganzen Lebens." WalterBenjamin, "Anmerkungenzum
Erziihler-Aufsatz,"in GesammelteSchriften(7 vols.; Frankfurtam Main: Suhrkamp,1980) 2.3:1285.
'4Here Butler follows Laplanche, who stresses the "delay" of the reaction to the original
overpowering of the child by the other (the mother). Compare Butler, Kritik, 63-65; and Thiem,
"Unbecoming Subjects."
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If the inauguralmomentsof the "I" are those in which I am implicated
by the Other,the Other'saddress,the Other'sdemand,then thereis some
convergencebetween the ethical scene in which my life is, from the
start,boundup with others,and the psychoanalyticscene that establishes
the intersubjective
conditionsof my own emergence,individuation,and
survivability.'"
What, however, does this convergence of ethics and psychoanalysis mean? Is
the "ethical arena"actually restrictedto the "renderedaccount" requiredof me,
and to that structurewhich enacts the speech-act of judgment by the other who is
addressingme? Butler seeks to escape this reduction of ethics to accountability
and the structureof judgmentwhen she urges that-at the very least-the opacity
of the self be taken into considerationby (mainstream)ethical reflection:
Die Struktur
derAdressierung
liegt demFillen von Urteilentiberjemanden
oder dessenHandlungenzugrunde,sie liasstsich abernicht auf das Urteil
reduzieren;das Urteil neigt ohne Riicksichtauf die in der Strukturder
Adressierung
implizierteEthikzurGewalt.16
According to Butler,it is the question "Who are you?" that, precisely because
it cannot be answered adequately,guaranteesan ethical stance which transcends
the common concept of accountability.This stance is ratherthe maintenance of
the question of identity, the attempt to escape the (violent) structureof social
judgment, which says, "Youare this or that, and as such I either approveof you or
I condemn you." A nonviolent approachto ethics, then, would attemptto escape
this judgmental structureby leaving the question unanswered. The other can be
determinedto have a particularidentity just as much as I can; and just as I must,
so must she give an account of her actions-and yet, for the sake of a nonviolent
ethics, this determinationmust be dismissed in favor of a radical indeterminacy
of the self and the other alike. The "practiceof nonviolence" that morality (as
a struggle against violence) demands would accordingly favor the rupture of a
coherentstory over the self's claim to give a coherent account of herself, because
any life-narrativecould only be the result of an act of power and judgment. This
rupturein the coherent life-story of the self would not, however, be the end of
the self, but ratherthe end of the fiction of coherency, of transparency,and of a
teleological account of identity.
Thus, in comparisonto Ricceur,Butleris more radicalin her assaulton the unity
of narrativeand ethical identity.The horizon of the life-story-that is, the unity of
differentstories,thoughnecessaryfor individuationandthe maintenanceof practical
selfhood and social relations, the self-concept that cannot and nevertheless must
"SButler,Giving an Account, 42.
16Butler,Kritik,76. The equivalentEnglish passage in Butler's manuscriptreads: "I'm preparing
to make another such argumentabout making moraljudgments as well, that the structureof address
conditions the making of judgments about someone or his actions, but that it is not reducible to the
judgment, and that the judgment unbeholden to the ethics implied by the structureof address, tends
towardviolence."
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be capturedin language, in discourse, in the narrativeof the biography-entails
violence against the opacity of the self. Narratingand narratedself, thus, are not
to be brought into convergence: each life-story is at the same time evidence of
the impossibility of an "authentic"narrativeof the self, and is entangled with the
question of fiction as an inherentdimension of the self's story.
Whatbecomes importantfor the concept of the moral self, however,is thatfrom
the ethical perspective of "giving an account of oneself," both the narrativeand
the failure of the narrativeare addressedtoward the other. Here, Butler's line of
reasoning, as I have noted, emphasizes the proximity of ethics to psychoanalysis.
The self-relation is not to be separatedfrom the relation to the other. Referring
to both Jean Laplanche's psychoanalysis and Levinas's ethics of responsibility,
Butler holds that the other takes responsibilityfor the self in his or her existence.
This non-neutralityof the relationshipbetween the self and the other cannot be
establishedin any kind of contractualor even discursiveresponsibilityfor the other.
It is establishedmuch earlier,namely in the openness of the self to the impressions
she receives in her exposure to the other.
Whatmightit meanto makean ethic fromthe regionof the unwilled?It
mightmeanthatone does not forecloseuponthatprimaryexposureto the
Other,thatone does not try to transformthe unwilledinto the willed,but
of exposureas the sign, the reminder,of a
to take the very unbearability
a commonphysicality,a commonrisk.17
commonvulnerability,
Ethical responsibility would then be an attitude that, in reflecting upon the
necessity of self-exposure, acknowledges and criticizes the inherent violence of
self-constitution,the impregnationof the self by social norms in this process, and
the inherentviolence of any moral identity based on the narrativeof the self. Humanitycan only be upheld at the price of acknowledgingan inherentinhumanityin
selfhood and even in ethics itself. What is pivotal for ethical reflection,then, is to
distinguishunavoidableassaults and unavoidableatrocitiesfrom those violations
that can be avoided.'18
Butis thispositionof acknowledgingthe violenceaccompanyingself-constitution,
andthusthe paradoxicalstructureof sub-jectivation,sufficientfor understandingthe
moral self? And is the "virtueof critique"in the face of unjustifiableviolationsin
social relationssufficientto make the concept of accountabilityand responsibility
workable?Can the convergenceof self-interestand solicitude that Ricoeurposits,
which in social ethics is transferredto the concept of justice, be narroweddown in
thismanner?Is not a richerconceptof responsibilityneeded,one thatis closely linked
to self-constitution,but neverthelessnot identicalto it?
'7Butler,Giving an Account, 57-58.
'8Inher recent book Precarious Life (London:Verso, 2004), Butler not only analyzes the structure
of judgment misusing the difference of the other in the service of an identity policy (construing
the burka worn by Afghan women as a sign of their bondage, from which they are to be liberated
by Westernpoliticians and by military force, is just one striking example she gives), but also gives
vast examples of avoidable violations to be met by ethical critique.
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My own attemptto understandthe implications of the shift in perspective from
the self to the other leads me to differ with both Ricoeurand Butler. While the
former proposes "solicitude"as a "sense" of the other without, however, taking
adequatelyinto accountthe experienceof exposurein the face of the other,the latter
develops a view of ethics thatstill does not addressthe shift from self-constitution
to the concept of responsibility(and not just accountabilityfor one's own actions
or even one's life)-a view thatrecognizes the othernot so much as someone who
requiresa concrete "response,"but ratheras someone who exercises the power of
definition over the self. One could certainly hold that this shift in perspective is
implicitly presupposedby Butler,since the self-otherrelationis reciprocal;but this
reciprocityneeds to be interpretedin light of an ethical concept of responsibility
that goes far beyond mere openness towardsthe other.
Therefore,I shall re-examine this ethic of responsibility,which proceeds from
the non-sovereigntyandpassivityof the self as constitutedby andthroughthe other.
While I do not meanto deny the relationof self-constitutionto psychic, discursive,
and social development,I am concerned primarilyto elucidate its relation to the
moral capacity of a fragile self.

i Levinas's Responsible Self and the Death of the Other
Both Ricoeurand Butler turn to Levinas as the reference point for their ethical
concepts, and this is quite striking,since no one could be more opposed to an ethics groundedin care for the self than Levinas. He is neither concerned with the
anxiety of the self for his or her own life (which lies at the base of every ethics of
the good life), nor does he sharethe assumptionof symmetrythat is manifested as
a contractualrelationshipor as a sharedview of the "commongood." Furthermore,
the statusof the social orderis secondaryin relationto the encounterwith the other.
In fact, "community"can, in a Levinasian ethics, only be conceived on the basis
of the heterogeneityand alterityof the other.
Thus,althoughLevinasis Ricoeur'scentralinterlocutorin Oneselfas Another,he
is usually an adversary.This is trueeven at points of very close proximitybetween
the two: Levinas does not share Ricoeur'sassumptionthat ethics is the spontaneous ethical strivingfor the good of oneself as well as for the good of the other.For
Levinas, the (re)instatementof symmetry where asymmetry is caused by power
relations is not the decisive moral moment. On the contrary,the self-provoking
asymmetry,the asymmetrybroughtinto being by the "face" of the other, is both
the occasion of and reasonfor morality.Accordingly,unlike Ricceur,Levinas cannot speak of the priorityof the ethical over the moral. Rather,he distances himself
from an ethics that combines care for the self and care for the other by positing
the absolute exteriorityand alterity of the other. In this respect, Butler's starting
point is actually much closer to Levinas's position than Ricoeur'sis. For Levinas,
the other is beyond any appropriationand expropriationby the self. Levinas not
only describes the phenomenologicalrelation of self, other, and world by starting
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with the other,but also anchorshis concept of responsibilityin the encounterwith
the other. In both "Time and the Other"and "Death and Time,"19 it is apparent
thatLevinas approachesresponsibilityfrom the startingpoint of the "deathof the
other,"a motif thatI shall refer to as the "structureof the adieu,"to emphasizethe
temporalnatureof the encounterwith the other.It is this choice of the deathof the
other as startingpoint that explains the transitionfrom mere self-constitutionby
way of the other to the specific conception of the moral self.20
The self-centerednessof the humanself-conatus essendi as the persistenceof
being or, ethically speaking,Heidegger's Selbstsorge-is problematicfor Levinas,
a solitaryidentityin a state of "enchainmentto itself."21As long as the self can take
on every "externalthing" and every "other"only by means of its own sameness,
in the modality of being, the self is sovereign but also alone:
The subjectis alonebecauseit is one. A solitudeis necessaryin orderfor
thereto be a freedomof beginning,theexistent'smasteryoverexisting-that
is, in brief,in orderfor thereto be an existent.Solitudeis thusnot only a
butalso a virility,a prideanda sovereignty.22
despairandan abandonment,
And yet, the self (in the Levinasian understandingof the term) can only come
into temporal existent23by transcendingthis specific self-centered solitude and
timelessness, because "solitude is an absence of time."24In contrast to subjectphilosophy,however,it is not self-reflectionthatenables the self to transcenditself
and reach the other-world.Self-transcendenceoccurs only and exclusively-and
this is Levinas's fundamentalconviction-beyond the self and his or her capacity
of agency.25But what is it that enables the "self" to transcendits solitude at the
price of sovereignty?
Loss of self-sovereignty can be understoodas an "event"or Widerfahrnis,26an
occurrencethatbefalls the passive and non-initiatingself. For any self, this loss of
191refer, above all, to these two texts, as well as to Otherwise Than Being, or, Beyond Essence
(trans.Alphonso Lingis; Pittsburgh:Duquesne University Press, 1998), which also may be numbered
among the principle works of Levinas. I hold, however, that his approachto the moral self is already
expressed in "Time and the Other"and "Death and Time."
20ForLevinas, of course, the ai-Dieu also refers to the religious structureor lineage of the relationship to self. In this respect the structureof responsibility is by no means the final word, nor
is it even the central word. It is in this existence "by," "for," and "before" God that theology is
situated and to be interpreted.
21EmmanuelLevinas, Time and the Other and Additional Essays (trans. Richard A. Cohen;
Pittsburgh:Duquesne University Press, 1987) 55.
22Ibid.
23Levinasdistinguishes himself from existence philosophy, and hence uses the term "existent"
instead of "existence" to designate the temporal identity of a self, transcending the "sameness"of
existence.
24Levinas,Time and the Other, 57.
25"Inorder for there to be an existent in this anonymous existing, it is necessary that a departure
from self and a returnto self-that is, that the very work of identity-becomes possible. Throughits
identificationthe existent is already closed up upon itself; it is a monad and a solitude" (ibid., 52).
261 use the Germanterm Widerfahrnis,which connotes passivity and non-sovereignty,to denote
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controlis threatening,but it can assumedifferentforms. One form, surely negative,
is suffering-pain which can be linked to existential self-alienation, and which
in its extreme forms is experienced as radical mortality.The threat of one's own
death is all the self can ever know about death:for death itself, there is neither an
"experience"nor a concept; it is pure im-possibility, alterity.27If death is anticipated in suffering, it cannot be "takenupon,"maintainsLevinas, in opposition to
Heidegger; it always overpowers.
Death in Heideggeris an event of freedom,whereasfor me the subject
seemsto reachthelimitof thepossiblein suffering.It findsitself enchained,
overwhelmed,andin some way passive.Deathis in this sense the limit of
idealism.28
Sufferingis the most extremeform of self-attachmentand hence the opposite of
responsibility:"The content of suffering merges with the impossibility of detaching oneself from suffering.... It is the fact of being directly exposed to being.""29
The impossibility of even caringfor oneself in the experience of suffering reduces
the sovereign, solitary self to a "stateof irresponsibility,the infantile shaking of
sobbing."30
In addition to suffering, Levinas considers the erotic encounter with another
person as another"event"whereby solitude is overcome. Eros, or erotic love, the
sensuality of touch and closeness, of the skin of anotherperson, is Widerfahrnis
that does not jeopardize the self-centered self as suffering does, but still changes
his or her "being in the world":"Love is not a possibility, is not due to our initiative, is without reason; it invades and wounds us, and nevertheless the I survives
in it."31In sensual proximity to and with the other-before any intention (in the
sense of appropriation)in which a yearning for presence is revealed, a presence
which neverthelesscannotbe found-the "self' not only experiences the other,but
also at the same time experiences the alterityof the other, the non-simultaneityof
him- or herself with the other.32Still further,the unattainabilityof the other's presence, the "unavoidabledelay" on which a perpetualrestlessness, a desire, feeds,
is at the same time also the experience of the transienceof time, an "adieu"to the
the specific type of experience Levinas speaks of. Levinas associated the Widerfahrnisof suffering
with mystery: "The unknown of death signifies that the very relationship with death cannot take
place in the light, that the subject is in relationship with what does not come from itself. We could
say it is in relationship with mystery" (ibid., 70).
27Ibid.,68-71.
28Ibid.,71.
29Ibid.
30Ibid.,72
31Ibid., 89.
32Thatis, Levinas seeks a way which is neither an ap-propriation (in the sense of a "takingover") of the other, nor an ecstatic fusion with the Same. The other requires, rather, in order to
be the other, a distinction insurmountableby the self. Compare Alain Finkielkraut, La sagesse de
l'amour (Paris: Gallimard, 1984). In Otherwise Than Being, Levinas expressly includes speaking
as a form of touching.
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experience of the moment. The in-congruenceof the self and the other,as experienced in the erotic encounter,is the origin of temporalityitself out of negativity:an
experiencingof the nonsimultaneityof the self and the otherand the irreversibility
of the moment-the very opposite of the notion of erotic love as fusion:
withthe otheris absenceof theother;not absencepureand
Therelationship
simple,notthe absenceof purenothingness,butabsencein a horizonof the
future,an absencethatis time.Thisis the horizonwherea personallife can
be constitutedin the heartof the transcendent
event,whatI calledabovethe
"victoryoverdeath."33
In the sensory"event,"the self initially encountersthe face of the otheras a kind
of "object of the world," as a phenomenon.At the same time, however, the self
encountersthe face as expression, as an expression of nakednessand vulnerability.
The Hebrewwordpdnifm("face")signifies not only the kernelof individualpersonhood, but also a surface thatis specifically naked in terms of exposure, a face that
does not lie and can feign nothing. Here Butler and Levinas closely agree:In the
relationshipof self and other,the self is exposed as a face that is not transparent,
but ratherimpressionableby the other.In and on the face of the other is inscribed
the temporalitythat is constitutivefor the structureof the adieu. On the face, time
itself is signified in nakedness. Death, which has not yet occurred, nevertheless
leaves a trace,just as a wrinkle in the skin remindsone of futuredeath.Age is the
sign of time, the sign of transienceand of mortality.In the closeness of the touch,
in the "face-to-face-ness"of the encounter,which never really reaches the other,
thereis-even worse thanthis non-presence-the farewell, the adieu, theunavoidable mortality,the futuredeathof the contemporaryother.Self-transcendencethus
occurs when the self is "touched"by and throughthe face of the otherin an erotic
or loving experience.
While Butler concentrateson the "impressionability"of the self by the other,
Levinas reverses the perspective. The self "sees"the nakednessof the face of the
other,"sees" the nakedness in the face of the other.This shift in perspectiveis, in
the end, crucial for the broaderdevelopment of the structureof responsibility.It
is not one's own anticipateddeath (as in Heidegger's Sein zum Tode) thatis the
"event"which turnsself-centerednessinto responsibility,but the deathof the other,
whereby the self comes into (moral) existence-is constituted as moral self, in
response to and responsible for the other:34
33Levinas,Time and the Other, 90.
34In psychoanalysis, at least, there is the understandingof the priority of the death of the other
over personal death. Jean Laplanche offers a hint: "I would say that the question of the enigma of
death is brought to the subject by the other. That is, it is the other's death that raises the question
of death. Not the existentialist question, 'Why should I die?' The question 'Why should I die' is
secondary to the question 'Why should the other die?,' 'Why did the other die?,' and so on" (Cathy
Caruth, "Interview with Jean Laplanche [23 October 1994]," Postmodern Culture 11.2 [2001],
http://www.iath.virginia.edu/pmc/text-only/issue.101/11.2caruth.txt).My thanks to Annika Thiem
for this reference.
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affectsmy identityas 'I' [moi];it is
Dying,as thedyingof theother[1'autre],
in its rupture
withtheSame,its rupture
of my 'I' [moi],its rupture
meaningful
of the Same in my 'I' [moi].35

The love of the otheris the emotionof the other'sdeath.It is my receiving
theother-and nottheanxietyof deathawaitingme-that is thereferenceto
death.Weencounterdeathin the face of the other.36
Hence, the encounterwith the other is an encounterwith time, expressed in the
vulnerable,mortalface calling for the self's response:
Someone who expresseshimself in his nudity-the face-is one to
the point of appealingto me, of placinghimselfundermy responsibility:
The otherindividuatesme in
Henceforth,I have to respondfor him.
.... of the otherwho dies affects
the responsibilityI have for him. The death
me in my very identityas a responsible"me"[moi];it affectsme in my
nonsubstantial
identity,whichis not the simplecoherenceof variousactsof
butis madeup of an ineffableresponsibility.37
identification,
Not playful desiringof the otherbut rathercaring love-which, like erotic love,
is groundedin the "face-to-face"encounter-is the unexplainableevent leadingboth
to the moral concept of the self, by integratingnon-sovereignty and the character
of Widerfahrnis,and to temporality,by way of the structureof the adieu. Caring
love or responsibilitymeans thatthe self cherishes a greatercare for and concern
for the other than for him- or herself. Indeed, if the structureof the adieu is not
consideredin this encounter,then the concept of responsibilityremainsvague and
even somewhat arbitrary.
In his laterwritings,Levinasincreasesthe seriousnessof responsibilityby calling
it an ob-session of the self by the other or the other's well-being, a sacrifice, a
responsibilitythat no one can undertakein my place.38What these terms have in
common is a sense of urgency,lest the decisive moment of action be missed--but
they also imply a certain violence in their description of the impact on the self.
While this terminology has led many to resist his radical reconfigurationof the
self-other encounter,Levinas himself was convinced that the encounter with the
othermust not be regardedas undue, or threatening,or even as a violent intervention into one's freedom and autonomyby the other,but as the "individuationof the
35EmmanuelLevinas, God, Death, and Time (trans. Bettina Bergo; Stanford, Calif.: Stanford
University Press, 2000) 13. Comparep. 12: "The death of the other who dies affects me in my very
identity as a responsible 'me' [moi]; it affects me in my nonsubstantial identity, which is not the
simple coherence of various acts of identification, but is made up of an ineffable responsibility."
36Ibid.,105.
37Ibid., 12.
38A thoroughanalysis must examine these hyperbolic rhetoricalphrases, which have provided the
strongest reasons for the "condemnation"of the Levinasian ethic. This criticism, raised especially
from a feminist perspective, is correctbutnevertheless fails to acknowledge Levinas's departurefrom
a "mainstream"ethics of autonomy, which was also criticized by feminist ethics unless grounded
in a much deeper understandingof relational personhood and dependency than libertarianstend to
acknowledge. For my critique of Levinas's ethics, see below.
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self' as moral self, who takes on the responsibility for the other to be taken care
of. He was also convinced that only a radicalruptureof the solitarily existing self
can turn"existence"into "existent."The shift from mere "being"to "existent"as
synonym for the moral self cannot, as we have seen, be logically deducedor even
explained;it restsuponan opennessof the self to the passive "event"or Widerfahrnis
of and in the encounterwith the other.Its roots lie in the dialectical experience of
passively being addressedand actively wishing to respond to the other's request
for the self to care about him or her. And since this response cannot be generalized or even transferredto someone else, given the individual and specific nature
of the Widerfahrnis,the self is notfree to be or become a moral self. And yet the
necessarily moral self is free to choose whetherto assume responsibilityby acting
accordingto the need of the other.39
Levinas revisited the turningpoint from being to responsibilityover and over
again,althoughthe specific interrelationof this turnwith the concept of temporality
must be emphasizedmore stronglythan it was by his firstreaders.40Nevertheless,
it is importantto stress thatit is very well possible, as Ricoeurremindsus, thatthe
othermight indeed ask the self for a response thatis undue,threatening,or violent.
Levinas ignored this objection at first but finally answered it by introducingthe
perspectiveof the "third."He concedes thathis perspectiveon the moralself might
lead one to ignoreone-sided,unjustified,or violent relationsof responsibility.These
are ratherthe result of the asymmetryof (social) power than of the asymmetryof
responsibility,and thus an ethics of responsibilitymust take into accountequality,
reciprocity,andjustice. Levinas does not deny thatthese featuresare necessaryfor
the constructionof a theory of ethics, but he does deny that they can be taken as
the startingpoint, or ratheras the occasion of and reason for morality.41It is only
at this second step, however, that most ethical theories, including that of Ricoeur,
begin. In light of what Levinas teaches us about the characterof Widerfahrnis,
solicitude, care, and com-passion are not phenomena that originate in a striving
towardsthe good for oneself andfor the other,comparableto an innatemoralsense;
rather,they are already the result of the Widerfahrnisof the other addressingthe
self and asking for a response.The self develops a self-identityonly throughbeing
addressedby the other,as is shown in developmentalpsychology, in the Hegelian
traditionof the social self (as this is taken up G. H. Mead), and somewhat differently in Butler's analysis of the social self. Levinas, however, is not interested
39Thereis, of course, the danger of misinterpretingthe actual "need" of the other and acting
paternalistically.Here, the violent structureof the self-otherencounterreturns,andmust be addressed
by the "responsible self." I am grateful to Annika Thiem for several discussions on this matter.
40Fora thorough study of the relation of Levinas and Heidegger from a feminist perspective, see
Tina Chanter, Time, Death, and the Feminine: Levinas with Heidegger (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford
University Press, 2001).
41SeeEmmanuel Levinas, Entre nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other(trans. Michael B. Smith and
BarbaraHarshav;New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); and idem, Die Spur des Anderen:
Untersuchungen zur Phdinomenologie und Sozialphilosophie (ed. and trans. Wolfgang Nikolaus
Krewani; Freiburg im Breisgau: Alber, 1983) .
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in this developmentof the self as a self, but startsby considering the experience
of the exposition of the self in the "event"of the encounter with the other.With
regardto ethical concepts of moral agency, he claims that the "atomic"solitude of
a "non-existent,"chained-to-itself "self' is wrongly considered the central focus
in theories of the moral self.
The merit of Levinas is that he has elucidated the dialectic of necessity and
freedom with respect to the moral self. But even as we appreciatehis tremendous
contributionto a betterunderstandingof what it means to be moral, we must note
that, from an ethical point of view, his reflections about the other as other are
strangely ahistorical and abstract. They are developed almost exclusively as a
phenomenologicalconcept, withoutproperlytakinginto considerationthe content
of ethical theory.This critiqueis also applicable,perhapseven particularly applicable, with regardto the thoroughanalysis of ethical problems.It is strikingthatin
Levinas'swritings,the centralcategoryof his ethicalapproach-the other-remains
oddly abstractandfaceless (which, curiously,is not the sense communicatedby the
Hebrew wordpanim), while in other contemporaryethical theories, the other has
been taken seriously as the "concreteOther,"and as such a historically mediated
categoryit has been introducedas complementaryto universalrespect.42Levinas's
reflectionson the other as an ethical concept are not wide-rangingenough, as evidenced by the underdevelopedrole of justice or of institutionsin his thought.
A furthercritiqueof Levinas's approachaddressesnot his rejection of the "autonomous self" as a presuppositionof moral theory, but the nature of the event
(Widerfahrnis)thatcharacterizesthe moralencounter.Certainly,his understanding
of the "event"is valuable to an experiential,even phenomenological analysis of a
"self"thatis disturbedby an encounterwith the otherandtherebyurgedto transform
her view of the world. But is the arbitrarinessof such an encountera sufficientbasis
for the concept of responsibility?Does not the latterrequirea self who is able to
put some distance between herself and her actions, as well as between herself and
others?Contraryto Levinas, Foucaultand Adorno have shown that responsibility
requires a self-reflective self; yet Foucault and Adorno also emphasize that this
self is not at all to be identified with the atomic, "free" subject that the ethical
traditionof the modem West has stressed. There are historical reasons, however,
for the emergence of this "autonomous,"unencumberedself, as well as for the
rise of liberalconcepts of ethics that seek, in the wake of modernity,to strengthen
the concept of autonomyover against social (and religious) norms.43Today,given
the triumphof individual autonomy in contemporaryethics, it is still necessary
to answerthe question of which responses (or obligations) can be justified of the
self, and which cannot.For this reason, a normativetheory of ethics that takes into
42SeeSeyla Benhabib, Situating the Self. Gender, Community,and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics (New York: Routledge, 1992).
43SeeCharlesTaylor,Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, Mass.:
HarvardUniversity Press, 1989).
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considerationits own close connection to violent (social) norms is indispensable,
and it is the task of a criticalethics to expose this connection. Nevertheless, ethics
must have two perspectives: the subjective, partial, and concrete perspective of
the agent who is addressedby the other and pledged to respond;and the universal
perspectiveof the "thirdparty,"namelythe institutionof justice. Withoutthe second
perspective, we cannot distinguish between the legitimate authorityof the other
and the threatening,life-taking, violent power of the other over the self, which
morality must fight against.
But Levinas also urges us to see the structure of the adieu as an inherent
dimension of, indeed as a key to understanding,the excessive, asymmetricalresponsibilityfor the other.Moralityandresponsibility,then, aredeeply rootedin the
acknowledgmentof temporalityandhistoricity,and, finally,of mortality.Whereas
other thinkers,especially religious ethicists, have emphasized mortalityor even
finitude as the horizon of human existence, it is not abstractfinitude as such that
matters,accordingto Levinas.Rather,it is the concretedeathof the other(grounded
in alterityand linked to infinity) that provokes the urgency of the self's response,
and that is the key to the shift from mere "being"to the moral self.
N

The Alterity of Death and the Ethics of Remembrance

JacquesDerridais one of the few philosopherswho have takenup Levinas's topic
of the "deathof the other"and the structureof the adieu, in his books Adieu to
EmmanuelLevinas and TheGiftofDeath.44Adieu is Derrida'sfarewellto Levinas,
a finalvaledictionat his funeralon 27 December 1995. Derrida'sspeech was a public-and laterpublished-act of biddingfarewell, but one thatnonethelessborders
on the intimacy of a long friendship.Derridadevotes this text to the mentorwho
taughthim the threefoldmeaningof adieu. It may signify a greetingor a farewell,
as well as the blessing of a friendat death.But adieuis also for Levinas theai-Dieu,
and this is the sense in which it is appropriatedby Derrida:"for God and before
God and before anything else or any relation to the other, in every other adieu."
This structureof the adieu underlies every kind of relation and has, accordingto
Derrida,far-reachingconsequences:"Everyrelationto the otherwould be, before
and after anythingelse, an adieu."45
Derridaclearly evokes the momentof transitionfrom the "presence"of a friend
to remembranceof the passed presence, the past. He re-calls Levinas,46but at
the same time he inscribes himself into the calling, interpretinghimself, his own
self, by the call. He, Derrida, is (re-)calling the other, but it is nevertheless the
"other,"Levinas, who speaks at his farewell-in the quotation of his friend. In
44JacquesDerrida, The Gift of Death (trans. David Wills; Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1995); andidem,Adieu to EmmanuelLevinas (trans.Pascale-AnneBraultandMichael Naas; Stanford,
Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999).
45Derrida,The Gift of Death, 47.
46TheGerman word for such a valediction is Nachruf, literally a "calling after" someone.
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this embeddednessof the otherin the speaker's words, the structureof the adieu is
presentedin a rhetoricalmanner.Forif "everyrelation"is "beforeandafteranything
else, an adieu,"and if the structureof the adieu establishes the moral dimension of
the self-otherrelationnot as a Hegelian strugglefor recognition, but as the responsibility of the self for the other,then this structureis revealed in its most extreme
form on the occasion of the deathof the other,thefinal adieu:The living person is
the only possible subjectwho can recall the life of the other.He or she is thus the
irreplaceable bearerof the responsibility to maintain the presence of the dead in
(historical)memory. Derridafollows this understandingin his text: He, Derrida,
continues to bear a responsibilitytoward his friend, but the responsibility-as-care
for the friend has been replaced by responsibility-as-remembrance.The death of
the otherreveals the structureof responsibility in its extremest form.
Even as it confers the responsibilityto rememberthe dead, death nevertheless
confirmsthe incapacityof themoralself. In the finaladieu,the self may experiencethe
most radicallimit of sovereigntyand "control"over life. Death is indeed the experience of total impotence,as Levinas claimed, but it is also the event (Widerfahrnis)
with thepotentialto individuatethe self as moralself. And, as we have seen above, to
definethefuturein whichdeathwill occur-and, hence, temporality-in termsof the
otheris to turnthe ethicalperspectivefrom self-preservationto care for the other.
Justas, in the encounterwith the other,the promiseto care is a "protest,"a resistance againstdeath,so is mourningitself also a resistanceto giving in to mortality,
finitude,anddeath.Forthe mourner,thereis no appeasement,no reconciliation.Nor
can she finda soothingbalancebetween recollection,which keeps the dead present,
and forgetting,which is necessaryfor the mournerto continue living. Indeed, as a
mourner,she mayeven wishthatthewoundof loss will not heal,while as an agent,she
needs oblivion, the scarringof the wound, to be able to continueto live and act.
But again, considered from an ethical perspective, and especially in view of
Levinas's highly rhetoricalemphasis on the death of the other and the pervasive
structureof the adieu,it is strangethatnot only the role of the otherin history,but also
of those who throughouthistoryhave died by violence, remainsremarkablyunderdefinedin his writings,even thoughhis thinkingis deeply rootedin the experienceof
the Shoah.Levinas does not, however,clarify the statusof the traumatizingexperiences of the twentiethcentury'sgenocides and the Shoah;it is ratheran underlying
presupposition,a backdropagainstwhich his writings are to be understood.47Not
only with respect to the concreteother,but also with respect to the structureof the
adieu,a historicalandpoliticalconcretizationis thereforerequired,a concretization
47Levinas'sunderstandingof the experience of death as the death of the other corresponds to
Merleau-Ponty'sdescription of traumaas the impossibility of time. Levinas was surely aware of this
connection, but he takes it as ontological description. In trauma,time is abolished. It has congealed
into an absolute present-a descriptionthat corresponds to the understandingof "being"by Levinas.
On a more psychological level, this interrelation of trauma and "being" also sheds some light on
Levinas's early essay "Time and the Other," which was so important for him (compare Maurice
Merleau-Ponty,Phenomenology of Perception [trans. Colin Smith; New York: Routledge, 2002]).
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that would have to reflect upon the relationof ethics and the (concrete,historical)
deathof the other.Whathas been said aboutthe distinctionbetween avoidableand
unavoidableviolence withregardto the constitutionof the self mustbe repeatedhere:
the distinctionbetweenthe unavoidabledeathof the otherandthe avoidable,violent
deathof the otherbecomes pivotal for and in ethicaljudgment.
Responsibility as care and responsibility as memory are both initiated in the
Widerfahrnis,the passive experience of being touchedby anotherpersonor being.
On the basis of this passivity,however,care andmemoryareto be seen as reflective
responsesto the initial experience.Ethicalmemoryis thus neitherspontaneousnor
It is, firstof all, the normativeclaim not to forget. Such a claim can only
neutral.48
be situatedhistorically.It can only be put forwardhistorically,and it can only be
fulfilled at a specific historical time.49
Today,we are awash in informationstreamingfrom media sources, and we are
well informedof the culturalandpolitical historiesof moralevil and violatedrights
thathave accompaniedour age of globalization and accelerateddevelopment.Yet
this surplusof informationis in dangerof becoming meaningless, for it is disconnected from any moral action on the part of the addressees of that information.
Currentinternationalindifferenceabout the well-publicized genocide in Sudanis
butthe latestexampleof suchdisconnection.Indeed,the riskthatthose who witness
atrocitiesas bystanderswill forget is higher than the risk that the victims of those
atrocitieswill be paralyzedby memory.The literaryreconfigurationof historical
violence andinjusticeby meansof the "crossedreference"of realityand fictioncan
alleviate both risks: it can be a reminderof the responsibilityborne by those who
might be too willing to forget; and it may be a way of articulatingthe collective
memoryof those who cannotforget.Narrativemay thus become an ethicalpractice
in andof itself, a mediumof andfor ethicalreflection,with respectto responsibility
not only as care-for-the-otherbut also as remembrance.If narrativeis necessarily
retrospectiveratherthanprospective,given its specificrelationto time, thenethical
reflectionthat is groundedin narrativeis relevant not only to the general concept
of ethics and morality,but even more so to an ethics of remembrance.50
Nelly Sachs is one of the few poets who preservedthe memoryof the victims of
the Shoah in their writing after 1945. Sachs, a Jew, escaped to Sweden in 1940. In
a cycle of poems titled "Epitaphs-Written into the Air," she rememberspersons
she knew before they were murdered.Withinthatcycle, the "Chorder Trister"is
a strikingexample of mnemosynic ethical practicewithin literature.(For the text
and an English translationof the poem, see pp. 378-79, below.)

48HereI follow BurkhardLiebsch, Geschichteals Antwortund Versprechen(Freiburgim Breisgau:
Alber, 1999); and idem, Trauer und Geschichte (ed. idem and JOrnRilsen; K61n:Bhhlau, 2001).
49Foran interpretationof WalterBenjamin's theory of memoryand its consequences for an ethics
of memory, see Haker,Moralische Identitiit.
SoSee,for example, Ricoeur,Time and Narrative.
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It is not by chance thatSachs places such emphasis on the question, "Whoof us
may comfort?"''Perhapsthis question, especially if it is posed with regardto the
theological significanceof the Shoah,resultsin the questioning-and collapse-of
theodicy.In lyric speech, all thatremainsis the poet who echoes religious tradition.
The poem evokes the cherub,which in Jewish-Christiantraditionis a figure that
protects God against enemies and honors him; in the poem, however, the cherub
is protectingthe dead, receiving the "lightningsof sorrow."In this metaphor,the
poem describeswhathistoricalmemoryis-or, rather,could be-through the figure
of the poet: a flowerless gardener,a singer without healing power. The poem cannot heal, it can only mourn. It watches the cherub and keeps present his actions.
In the biblical context, the cherub is a mediator between heaven and earth, and
has, for example, the task of guardingthe entranceto paradisein Genesis; cherubs
also function as God's divine chariotin the book of Ezekiel. Nelly Sachs's cherub,
however, is not God's guard,but ratheranother"angel of history,"along with that
of WalterBenjamin: an angel grinding the lightnings of sorrow with his wings,
without any apparentpurpose,transformingthe lightnings of sorrow but yet leaving open the cleft between past and future,"like the edges of a wound, which must
remainopen, that may not yet heal."
If poetry or literatureas a whole (as well as other forms of artistic expression,
especially visual art,dance, or music) may be remindersof the death of the other,
andtherebyremindersof the specific responsibilityto rememberhistoricalviolence
and injustice, then ethical reflection should strive to use these kinds of aesthetic
practicesas models for moralpractice.In the "crossedreference"of aesthetics and
ethics, it might be possible for the moral self to endure the tension by which it is
torn apart:on the one hand, the moral self faces its own indifference towards the
other, which stems from melancholy and a reluctanceto take action; on the other
hand,it faces the inexplicableambiguityof responsibilityas both care andmemory,
which always runs the risk of violating either the other in his or her otherness or
the self in his or her autonomy.While this tension and ambiguity of moral agency
is articulated in literaryworks, it can only be addressed in the self-reflectivity of
the moral self.
Therefore, the role of narrativegoes far beyond being a constitutive part of
self-identity.The self-who is indeed, as Butler and Ricoeurclaimed, dependent
on the narrativesof others, as well as on self-narratives,to develop or uphold an
identityover time-is likewise dependenton narrativeas a moral self, questioning
moral convictions and visions of the "other"from the point of view of the self as
sameness. It is also dependenton narrative(and on literaryreflection as a part of

5I thankRia van den Brandtfor her interpretationof the complete text and many furthercomments.
See her "Nimbgue:la trace de la blessure et le ch6rubindans le "Choeurdes consolateurs"de Nelly
Sachs," in La trace: Entre absence et presence, actes du colloque international de Metz (ed. PierreMarie Beaude, Jacques Fantino, Marie-AnneVannier,and Erik Borgman;Paris: Cerf, 2004).
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Chor der Trister

Gairtnersind wir, blumenlos gewordene
Kein Heilkrautliasstsich pflanzen
Von Gesternnach Morgen
Der Salbei hat abgebliihtin den WiegenRosmarinseinen Duft im Angesicht der neuen Toten verlorenSelbst der Wermutwar bitternurfur gestern.
Die Bltiten der Trostes sind zu kurz entsprossen
Reichen nicht fur die Qual einer Kindertraine.
Neuer Same wird vielleicht
Im Herzen eines nachtlichenSingers gezogen.
Wer von uns darf trtsten?
In der Tiefe des Hohlwegs
Zwischen Gesternund Morgen
Steht der Cherub
Mahlt mit seinen Fltigeln die Blitze der Trauer
Seine Haindeaber halten die Felsen auseinander
Von Gesternund Morgen
Wie die Raindereiner Wunde
Die offenbleiben soll
Die noch nicht heilen darf.
Nicht einschlafenlassen die Blitze der Trauer
Das Feld des Vergessens.
Wer von uns darf troisten?
Gairtnersind wir, blumenlos gewordene
Und stehen auf einem Stern,der strahlt
Und weinen.

fromFahrtins Staublose:Gedichteby Nelly Sachs.
Germantext of "ChorderTraister,"
Reprinted
by permissionof Suhrkamp
Verlag.
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Chorus of Comforters

We are gardenerswho have no flowers.
No herb may be transplanted
from yesterdayto tomorrow.
The sage has faded in the cradlesRosemary lost its scent facing the new deadEven wormwood was only bitteryesterday.
The blossoms of comfort are too small
Not enough for the tormentof a child's tear.
New seed may perhapsbe gathered
In the heartof a nocturnalsinger.
Which of us may comfort?
In the depths of the defile
Between yesterdayand tomorrow
The cherub stands
Grindingthe lightnings of sorrow with his wings
But his hands hold apartthe rocks
Of yesterday and tomorrow
Like the edges of a wound
Which must remainopen
That may not yet heal.
The lightnings of sorrow do not allow
The field of forgettingto fall asleep.
Which of us may comfort?
We are gardenerswho have no flowers
And standupon a shining star
And weep.

"Chorusof Comforters"
fromTheSeekerand OtherPoemsby Nelly Sachs,translatedby
RuthandMatthewMeadandMichaelHamburger.
Translation
copyright? 1970by Farrar,
Straus& Giroux,Inc.Reprinted
by permissionof Farrar,StrausandGiroux,LLC.
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narrativesand works of art)in orderto explore the possibilities of agency, as well
as its limits. Finally, the self is dependenton narrativein orderto questionethical
theorythatis insensitive to concretesituations,moralconflicts, andthe "fragilityof
goodness,"to borrowMarthaNussbaum'sterm.52Thus, what is expressedthrough
the medium of narrativeis the impossibility of overcoming the tension between
speakingandkeeping silent, between agency andnon-agency (by way of passivity
or suffering),betweenbeing oneself and another,betweenfragilityand sovereignty,
between forgettingand memory,and finally between life and death. In contrastto
Aristotelian,teleologicalnarrativesof events (as in historicalnovels) or of individual
lives (as in the nineteenth-centuryBildungsroman),several other forms of narrative have emerged in the last century,and the deeply self-reflexive narrativesof
modernand postmodernliteraturehave become the rule ratherthan the exception.
Such narrativesare deeply groundedin the (particularlymodern)acknowledgment
that representationof "reality"is possible only by way of construction,andthat a
simple concept of mimesis is not sufficient. The most intriguingworks of art are
those that challenge and question a view of the world that the reader,spectator,or
auditormight have held before enteringthe "world"of a narrativeor of a specific
aestheticperspective,which displaces "reality"just a little bit, and therebyraising
it to consciousness.53Certainly,in the globalized world of the twenty-firstcentury,
literature'srole will be Aristotelianinsofar as it preservesparticularperspectives
on individuallives, histories, cultures, and languages alike, all of which are ways
of mediating the encounterof the self and the other.At the same time, however,
literaturewill also be a means for exploring the abyss of the self and humanexistence, the exposition, nudity,and alterityof humanlife itself. The role of narrative
or "story-telling"must be reconsideredoutside the frameworkof teleology and
metaphorsof the "unityof life."
Perhapsthe role of narrativewill proveto be moremodestthanI have suggested;
nevertheless, narrativeis much more relevant for ethical reflection than has been
claimed in discussions of the ethics and aesthetics of the good life. Especially at a
time when ourinformationsurplusthreatensto disconnectthe awarenessof violence
andinjusticefrommoralaction,the relationof historicalrealityandliteraryimagination becomes urgent.In telling andbearingwitness to those woundsthatcorrespond
with historicalevents andnotjust with mortalityabstractlyconceived-wounds that
have been andare now being unjustlyinflictedon the self andon the other-stories
rebelagainstthe passageof time, againstforgetting,andagainstdeath.Furthermore,
narrativeandmoralitymay be unitedin theirrebellionagainst(moral)indifference:
52SeeMarthaC. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedyand
Philosophy (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press, 1986); and eadem, Poetic Justice: TheLiterary Imagination and Public Life (Boston: Beacon, 1995). For a more comprehensive study of the
relation, see Haker, Moralische Identitdt, and eadem, "Ban graven images: Literaturals Medium
ethischer Reflexion," in Literaturohne Moral: Literaturwissenschaftenund Ethik im Gespriich(ed.
Christoph Mandry;Muenster: LIT, 2003) 67-83.
53FranzKafka, for example, was a master of such displacement.
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Insofaras literatureis arousedby injustice as well as by the need to rememberthe
dead-and especially insofaras it is arousedby unjustdeaths-literature will keep
open the wound of death.Likewise, in being moral,the self will acceptresponsibility for others, striving to remain critically aware of the ethical violence inherent
within the agency of moraljudgment.
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